No Changes to UCR 2008, Change 3, Section 5.6, Generic Security Device Requirements.

This Errata sheet will be used as a placeholder for future changes made to this section.

SECTION	CORRECTION	EFFECTIVE DATE

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5.6 GENERIC SECURITY DEVICE REQUIREMENTS

5.6.1 Introduction

This section presents a product overview of End Cryptographic Units (ECUs) encryption products, e.g., High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) and Link Encryptor Family (LEF). Subordinate subsections of this section provide the core interoperability requirements applicable to each HAIPE and LEF cryptographic device. The requirements were extracted from the Generic Cryptographic Interoperability Requirements Document (GCIRD), Version 1.3, dated 07 January 2008. The GCIRD was developed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and provides DoD with vetted requirements critically needed for JITC testing and certification of Information Assurance products developed under the Commercial Communications Security (COMSEC) Evaluation Program (CCEP). The development of the GCIRD was requested by the Joint Staff; however, the GCIRD is no longer in existence under this name. Section 5.6 of the UCR is a direct replacement of the GCIRD.

Interoperability and Supportability needs are addressed in CJCSI 6212.01D, Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS). CJCSI 6212.01D establishes policies and procedures for developing, coordinating, reviewing, and approving interoperability and supportability needs, as well as certifying that those needs have been met. This section of the UCR provides a set of standards to address interoperability engineering and testing of CCEP products. The purpose of this section is to provide a coordinated and testable set of requirements to ensure interoperability certification of modernized ECUs.

Section 5.6 establishes interoperability requirements to guide product development so that they can achieve Joint interoperability certification. The scope of these requirements is limited to NSA-approved CCEP products and other COMSEC products not covered by traditional capabilities documents intended for DoD. This document is a dynamic document and will be maintained and updated on an annual basis or as required by the Joint Services Cryptographic Modernization Working Group (JSCMWG) Cryptographic Products Testing (CPT) Integrated Product Team (IPT).

NOTE: Use of Cryptographic Devices from Approved Products List (APL): Service components and organizations shall confirm with their respective Chief Information Officer (CIO) which cryptographic devices are appropriate for use on their communications networks. Devices on the UC APL must be internally validated by the services and components for use at the service or component level. The UC APL supports the Unified Capabilities or the Defense Information System Network (DISN); it does not replace a requirement for the services or components to obtain authorization from their service specific CIO prior to procurement.

Devices that have not met service specific requirements must be evaluated for appropriateness prior to acquisition and installation on any DoD Network, either Deployable or Fixed.

5.6.2 Security Products Overview

The ECUs are components of information systems that provide security services, which may include confidentiality, identification and authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, to the overall system. Typically, the ECU is integrated with other components to provide the overall security required for the system. As such, neither the ECU nor the encryption function provided is a standalone system. Figure 5.6-1, ECU Overview Diagram, illustrates the use of the ECU in a system.



Figure 5.6-1. ECU Overview Diagram

A HAIPE is a programmable IP Information Security (INFOSEC) device with traffic protection, networking, and management features that provide Information Assurance services for IPv4 and IPv6 networks. The HAIPE(s) that are version 3.x compliant meet the DoD mandate for IPv6 compatibility and the goals of the Cryptographic Modernization Initiative (CMI), and are a key component of the GIG Vision. The HAIPE device is designed to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication services for IP traffic for Deployable and Fixed network applications. The HAIPE enables secure transmission across WANs via IP packet encryption to compatible destination network security devices where decryption takes place. Figure 5.6-2, Example HAIPE Application Diagram, provides an example of HAIPE implementation within a WAN.



Figure 5.6-2. Example HAIPE Application Diagram

Design requirements are captured and promulgated in the HAIPE Interoperability Specification (IS). The HAIPE IS provides interoperability requirements for the following interconnections:

- HAIPE Device to HAIPE Device
- HAIPE Device to Key Management Infrastructure (KMI)

- HAIPE Device to Security Management Infrastructure (SMI)
- HAIPE Device to Network Component Infrastructure (NCI)

A HAIPE compliancy, (a.k.a., "HAIPE Interoperability Certification") is granted by the NSA for a COMSEC device that complies with HAIPE IS v3.0.x. Whereas JITC interoperability Certification deals with interoperability as defined by CJCSI 6212.01D, JITC certification will not be granted until the device is Type-1 certified by NSA. The HAIPE compliance is met by meeting the requirements in the Networking Core and Traffic Protection Core Specifications, plus the three Classified cryptography specifications (Suite A, Suite B, and Legacy), and any Extension Specifications. In HAIPE IS 3.1.x, the Networking Core and Traffic Protection Core Specifications have been combined into a single Core specification.

Link Encryptor Family ECUs provide data security for the U.S. Military, U.S. Government, allied forces, and coalition security environments. Current LEF devices include link and bulk Encryptors. The LEF's primary mission is to protect Classified and sensitive digital data in a multitude of network environments: point-to-point, netted, broadcast, or high-speed trunk. The LEF ECU provides the means for encryption and decryption using Suite A and Suite B data security while providing advanced key management features that support the current key distribution system and the KMI initiatives.

The LEF ECUs are backward compatible with their legacy family members of equipment to the degree necessary to support continuous operations. Although LEF requirements will vary based on implementation, JITC interoperability testing is still required. Additional testing may be required based on individual Services requirements.

The LEF Specification establishes the detailed cryptographic requirements and basic functional, performance, and security requirements of the Cryptographic Modernization (CM) version of the LEF link/bulk ECUs. This section incorporates the appropriate LEF Specification requirements to provide a sufficiently detailed baseline set of requirements while allowing vendors design flexibility as to the form, fit, and additional functionality of the resulting ECUs. Figure 5.6-3, Example LEF Application Diagram, illustrates the use of the LEF in a system.



Figure 5.6-3. Example LEF Application Diagram

5.6.3 Minimum Requirements

The following subsections present minimum ECU requirements organized by operational capability category.

5.6.3.1 Flexible and Robust Security

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs shall have the capability to be loaded and configured with legacy algorithms and modes to provide legacy-interoperable encryption services with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs shall have an inherent Information Assurance capability to ensure information and process integrity (during storage, processing, transmission, and presentation) to prevent unauthorized or unintended changes with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.2 Interfaces

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs shall be capable of loading and accepting keying material (KEYMAT) from NSA-approved key fill devices with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs shall include a DS-101 cryptographic fill port interface IAW EKMS 308 with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: LEF] The LEF ECUs shall implement data interfaces that conform to the EIA-530 standard.

[Required: LEF] The LEF ECUs shall implement data interfaces that conform to the RS-232 standard.

5.6.3.3 Operational Management

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs shall recover last known, good operational state/settings after loss of primary power with 90 percent reliability.

[Conditional: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs should have the capability to provide data to management devices to generate user defined high-level operational status reports with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: HAIPE] The HAIPE(s) shall not preclude operation over low bandwidth networks as low as 2.4 kB/s with 90 percent reliability.

[Conditional: HAIPE] The HAIPEs should have the capability to execute the In-Line Network Encryptor (INE) Management command and control function with 90 percent reliability.

[Conditional: HAIPE] The HAIPEs should have the capability to execute the Backup Remote Management (RM) command and control function with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: LEF] The LEF ECUs shall be capable of operating with legacy Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) architectures for networked data exchange with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: LEF] The LEF ECUs shall be able to automatically recover security connections after loss of power on one end or both ends of a channel with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.4 Zeroization

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] The ECUs shall prevent the accidental deletion of all loaded operational key with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.5 Maintainability and Serviceability

[Required: HAIPE and LEF] As a minimum, new software releases shall be backward compatible with the previous NSA-certified version of software with 90 percent reliability.

[Required: LEF] The LEF ECUs shall provide autophase if interoperable with KG-84C with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.6 Data Recovery

[Required: HAIPE] The HAIPE(s) shall be able to recover security associations after loss of power on one end or both ends of the link with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.7 External Interfaces

[Required: HAIPE] The HAIPE(s) shall adhere to standard commercial interfaces (e.g., Ethernet, Fast Ethernet, Gigabit Ethernet, or 10Gigabit Ethernet).

[Required: HAIPE] The HAIPE(s) devices shall be compatible with network components such as routers and hosts in common usage within the GIG Information Assurance architecture with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.8 Programmability

[Required: HAIPE] The HAIPE(s) shall be capable of being reprogrammed with updated cryptographic software and algorithms with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.9 Performance

[Required: HAIPE] The HAIPE(s) shall operate over connections to satellite links that experience delays of up to two seconds aggregate with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.10 Network Operations

[Required: HAIPE] When subjected to 70 percent or greater of rated throughput, HAIPE(s) shall maintain secure communications without interruption (i.e., without reboot) with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.3.11 Key Management

[Required: LEF] The LEF ECUs shall have Over-the-Air-Rekey (OTAR) capability with 90 percent reliability.

5.6.4 Operational Control over Features and Capabilities Management

Section 5.6 augments CCEP-required documentation, such as the product/system-specific Telecommunications Security Requirements Document (TSRD) and Information Assurance Security Requirements (IASRD).

5.6.5 General Specification Language

Section 5.6 uses non-UCR terminology to define the weighting factors incorporated into the ECU requirement specifications. This differs from the language used in Section 5.1.4, General Requirement Language. The mapping from the old GCIRD to UCR terminology is presented in the following paragraphs:

- The term "SHALL" designates the most important weighting level; that is, mandatory. In Section 5.6, this requirement has been mapped to the term "REQUIRED."

- The term "SHOULD" designates requirements, which are requested but are not mandatory. In Section 5.6, this requirement has been mapped to the term "CONDITIONAL."

5.6.6 Relationships among UC Requirements Documents

The following assumptions, dependencies, and references pertain to the ECU products described throughout Section 5.6 and amplify the relationships among UCR documents discussed in Section 5.1.5, AS-SIP Requirement Adheres to IETF Specification Language.

5.6.6.1 Assumptions and Dependencies

All assumptions and dependencies developed by the Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) regarding external factors that may affect interoperability and acquisition processes supported by Section 5.6 are identified by the following:

- Policy (i.e., CJCSI 6212) will be modified as appropriate.
- DoD testing community, to include respective service test commands, will accept and use Section 5.6.
- DOD Architecture Framework (DODAF) products and NR-KPP will be addressed in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documentation of systems utilizing CCEP products.
- SCIP products are covered elsewhere in the UCR.

5.6.6.2 Applicable Documents

Section 5.6 provides interoperability requirements for product development and Joint interoperability certification. The scope of these requirements is limited to approved NSA CCEP products and other COMSEC products not covered by traditional capabilities documents intended for DoD. Section 5.6 and underlying database will also serve as a cryptographic requirements reference document readily available to the testing community, program managers across DoD, and commercial vendors. This document identifies the core interoperability requirements for cryptographic products and those unique requirements common to individual cryptographic families.

Section 5.6 is for use by all DoD Components (including COCOMs, Services, and Agencies) and commercial vendors to aid in development of ECUs. It applies to development of new cryptographic products as well as major hardware and software upgrades for existing CryptoMod-compliant products. Section 5.6 applies to cryptographic equipment/devices procured for installation in the GIG. For Joint interoperability testing and certification, this document takes precedence over the explicit or implicit requirements of subsidiary or reference documents, standards, and specifications unless applicable, validated JCIDS documents already exist.

Tables 5.6-1 through 5.6-6 provide a detailed listing of the applicable Government and non-Government documents. These tables were extracted and updated as applicable from the GCIRD version 1.3, dated January 07, 2008.

Table 5.6-1. Core Government Documents

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
NSA/CSS POLICY NUMBER 3-9	Cryptographic Modernization Initiative Requirements for Type 1 Cryptographic Products	28 Mar 2003
CM MA ICD	Cryptographic Modernization Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document	14 Aug 04

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
MIL-STD-1275D	Department of Defense Interface Standard Characteristics of 28 Volt dc Electrical Systems in Military Vehicles	29 Aug 2006
MIL-STD-961E	Department of Defense Standard Practice Defense and Program-Unique Specifications Format and Content	01 Aug 2003
MIL-STD-167-1A	Department of Defense Test Method Standard Mechanical Vibrations of Shipboard Equipment	02 Nov 2005
MIL-HDBK-502	DOD Handbook Acquisition Logistics	30 May 1997
EKMS 217	EKMS Benign Techniques Specification Rev G	21 Dec 2001
EKMS 322B	EKMS FIREFLY Specification (SECRET)	05 Apr 2002
EKMS 218	Generic Rekey Front End System Requirements	13 Dec 2001
MIL-STD-1399C (NAVY)	Interface Standard For Shipborne Systems	02 Feb 1988
DODD 4630.5	Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS)	05 May 2004
CJCSI 6212.01D	Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and National Security Systems	08 Mar 2006
CJCSI 3170.01E	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System	11 May 2005
EKMS 308	Key Distribution Functional Standard Rev D SCN-2	23 Mar 2004
	KMI CI-2 CDD	17 Feb 2005
MIL-HDBK-5400	Military Handbook Airborne General Guidelines for Electronic Equipment	30 Nov 1995
MIL-HDBK-454A	Military Handbook General Guidelines for Electronic Equipment	03 Nov 2000
MIL-S-901D (NAVY)	Military Specification Requirements for Shock Tests, H.I. (High-Impact) Shipboard Machinery, Equipment, and Systems	17 Mar 1989
CNSSI 4009	National Information Systems Security INFOSEC Glossary	Sep 2000
DODI 5000.2	Operation of the Defense Acquisition System	12 May 2003
CJCSM 3170.01B	Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System	11 May 2005
	P^3 Generation & Distribution Specification for Foreign Interoperability In-Line Network Encryptors (INE), v2	20 Oct 2005
DODI 4630.8	Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS)	30 Jun 2004
NIST SP 800-56A	Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Application	Apr 2006
MIL-HDBK-217F	Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipments	28 Feb 1995
CNS 4005	Safeguarding Communications Security Facilities and Materials	Aug 1997
KMI 3003	Sender Intermediary Receiver (SIR) Model	29 Oct 2005
	TECOM Test Operations Procedure (TOP) 1-2-511	29 Dec 1989
DODD 5000.1	The Defense Acquisition System	24 Nov 2003

Table 5.6-2. HAIPE Government Documents

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
	HAIPE (Version 1.35) Remote Manager Test Plan v1.1	22 Feb 2006
	HAIPE Interoperability Specification (IS) 1.3.5	11 May 2004
	HAIPE Interoperability Specification 3.1.0	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Auto Security Association Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Gateway Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Generic Discovery Client Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Implicit Peer Enclave Prefix Discovery Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Legacy Discovery Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Legacy Encapsulating Security Payload Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Reachability Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Remote Configuration and Monitor Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Remote Provisioning Authority Extension	31 Dec 2006
	HAIPE IS 3.1 Remote Provisioning Extension	31 Dec 2006
DISA/JITC	High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Interoperability Test Plan	Mar 2006
DISA/JITC	High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Interoperability Test Report	Aug 2006
	TRADOC Futures Center Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) ANALYSIS for the High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE)	22 Aug 2005

Table 5.6-3. LEF Government Documents

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
	KIV-7M Encryption Device Release 1.0 Interoperability Assessment Plan	Jul 2006
	LEF Key Specification, Rev E	01 Nov 06
	LEFCIS Classified Appendix	09 May 2006
NSA 03-01A	Link Encryptor Family (LEF) Cryptographic Interoperability Specification Version 2.1.0	09 May 2006
	TRADOC Futures Center Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Analysis for the Link Encryptor Family (LEF)	22 Aug 2005

Table 5.6-4. Core Non-Government Documents

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
ANSI/EIA-310-D-92	Cabinets, Racks, Panels and Associated Equipment. American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/Electronic Industries Association (EIA) Standard	Sep 1992
ITU P.Imp563	Implementers Guide for ITU-T Recommendation P.563	
RFC 3647	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certification Policy and Certification Practices Framework	Nov 2003
ITU-T Recommendation P.800.1	Mean Opinion Score (MOS) Terminology	Mar 2003

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
ITU-T Recommendation P.800	Methods for subjective determination of transmission quality (formerly P. 80)	1996
ITU-T Recommendation P.563	Single-ended method for objective speech quality assessment in narrow-band telephony applications.	2004
ASME Y14.35M	This standard defines the practices for revising drawings, associated documentation, and establishes methods for identification and recording revisions. The revision practices of this Standard apply to any form of original drawing and associated documentation.	08 Dec 1997
ASME Y14.24	This standard defines the types of engineering drawings most frequently used to establish engineering requirements. It describes typical applications and minimum content requirements. Drawings for specialized engineering disciplines (e.g., marine, civil, construction, optics) are not included in this Standard.	01 Jan 1999
ASME Y14.100	This standard establishes the essential requirements and reference documents applicable to the preparation and revision of engineering drawings and associated lists. It is essential that this standard be used with ASME Y14.24, ASME Y14.34M, and ASME Y14.35M.	01 Jan 2004
ASME Y14.34M	This standard establishes the minimum requirements for the preparation and revision of parts lists, application lists, data lists, and index lists. In addition, this standard presents certain options that may be into incorporated into parts lists, data lists, index lists, application lists, indentured data lists, and wire lists at the discretion of the design activity.	01 Jan 1996
	Universal Serial Bus (USB) Specification Version 2.0	07 Dec 2000
RFC 4108	Using CMS to Protect Firmware Packages	Aug 2005

Table 5.6-5. HAIPE Non-Government Documents

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
RFC 3414	User-Based Security Model for SNMP V3	Dec 2002
RFC 3415	View-Based Access Control Model SNMP	Dec 2002

Table 5.6-6. LEF Non-Government Documents

DOC ID	NAME	DATE
EIA-530	Electronics Industries Alliance (EIA) Standard for the Interconnection of DTE and DCE Employing Serial Binary Data Interchange with Control Information Exchanged on Separate Control Circuits	
RS-232	Recommended Standard 232 for Serial Binary Data Signals Connecting Between a DTE and a DCE	